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Abstract 
This paper examines how market institutions can affect links between urban and 
rural areas with specific emphasis on goods market integration in the national context.  
Traditionally, development researchers and practitioners have focused either on rural 
market development or on urban market development without considering the 
interdependencies and synergies between the two.  However, more than ever before, 
emerging local and global patterns such as the modern food value-chain led by 
supermarkets and food processors, rapid urbanization, changes in dietary composition, 
and enhanced information and communication technologies point to the need to pay close 
attention to the role of markets both in linking rural areas with intermediate cities and 
market towns and promotion of economic development and poverty reduction. 
This paper begins with a presentation of a conceptual framework of market 
integration and then identifies five major factors that increase the transfer costs that 
subsequently hinder market integration between rural and urban areas:  information 
asymmetry, transaction costs, transport and communication costs, policy induced 
barriers, and social and noneconomic factors.  Five specific cases in five developing 
countries are examined in this study to demonstrate the primary sources of transfer costs 
and the aspects of market institutions that are important to market integration and 
promotion of rural-urban linkages. 
While emerging institutions such as modern intermediaries linked to supermarkets 
and food processors can reduce information asymmetries between rural producers and 
urban consumers, existing institutions such as producers’ cooperatives can pool the risks, 
increase the bargaining power of small producers, reduce enforcement costs, and thereby 
reduce transaction costs.  In addition, new types of partnerships between businesses and 
NGOs, and between public and private sectors, can improve infrastructure provision 
which, in turn, can reduce transport and communication costs.  To the contrary, the 
presence of inappropriate policies or noneconomic factors such as those that involve 
social exclusion take on a negative role in linking urban and rural markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
The relative emphasis placed on rural versus urban areas in the development 
policies of developing countries has shown considerable variation over time.  Generally, 
these development strategies have addressed either urban or rural areas rather than the 
interdependencies between the two.  This situation is very well known in the literature of 
rural-urban linkages as the “rural-urban divide.”  Recently, however, there is a growing 
recognition of the importance of focusing on the mutual interdependencies, rather than 
the “separateness,” of rural and urban areas because the livelihoods of rural and urban 
households rely on both “rural-based” and “urban-based” resources as well as the 
exchanges between the two areas.
1  
Emerging local and global patterns such as increased urbanization, agro-
industrialization, and the rise of supermarkets and globalization also favor the synergy 
rather than the division between rural and urban areas.  For instance, rapid urbanization 
necessitates improving rural-urban linkages in order to assure an adequate food supply at 
affordable prices.  On the other hand, rural markets may also serve as outlets for goods 
produced in urban areas and abroad and link rural consumers with national and 
international markets.  This implies that in the absence of strong rural-urban linkages, 
urban areas might face food shortages and rural areas might be left out of globalization.  
The emergence of new institutions such as the rapid rise of supermarkets in developing 
countries also requires major changes in food supply chains and stronger rural-urban 
linkages (Dries, Reardon, and Swinnen 2004; Hu et al. 2004; Weatherspoon and Reardon 
2003; Reardon and Berdegue 2002). 
In general, there are two important types of interactions between rural and urban 
areas (Tacoli 1998).  The first one involves the spatial interactions that take place 
between urban and rural areas.  These include the flows of people, goods, money, 
information, and wastes.  The second type of interaction is concerned with a sectoral 
                                                 
1 For recent reviews and further discussion, see Ashley and Maxwell 2001; Douglass 1998; Ellis and Biggs 
2001; de Janvry, Murgai, and Sadoulet 2002; Start 2001; Tacoli 1998.   2
interaction, including  traditionally “rural” activities taking place in urban and peri-urban 
areas (such as agriculture) and traditionally “urban” activities (such as manufacturing and 
services) taking place in rural areas. 
Different markets, such as goods, factor, and financial markets, link rural and 
urban areas.  Thus, the efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure and market and 
nonmarket institutions are important in linking rural and urban areas.
2  Key research 
questions, then, include:  What are the critical infrastructural and institutional barriers to 
greater links between urban and rural areas?  What are the policy and program 
interventions needed to create infrastructure and to facilitate or strengthen institutions to 
forge dynamic links between businesses, sectors, and geographic areas?  
This study focuses on how institutions promote or inhibit market exchanges for 
goods, a key link between urban and rural areas.  After providing a review of the 
concepts on how certain institutional barriers prevent trade, a number of case studies are 
presented to provide real-world illustrations of how institutions work, or do not, to 
overcome these barriers and connect urban and rural areas. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section, Section 2, develops a 
conceptual framework for understanding spatial relationships between rural, intermediate 
towns and cities, and metropolitan areas in goods markets.  Section 3 describes specific 
factors affecting the functioning of goods markets and their effects on rural-urban 
linkages.  In Section 4, the study presents some developing-country examples of ways to 
address these factors when they present barriers to the efficient and effective functioning 
of the links in goods markets.  Section 5 discusses lessons and policy alternatives that 
may address these factors and improve the benefits of urban-rural linkages. 
                                                 
2 We adopt an inclusive view in which institutions are defined as the structure of relations between 
individuals within the system of market interactions and in which the players include producers, 
consumers, and the state.  As well as the players, this definition includes the rules of the game (relations 
between the players).  Nonmarket institutions are institutions created by societies where markets fail, to 
correct the resulting inefficiencies.    3
2.  Spatial Rural-Urban Linkages:  A Conceptual Framework 
The literature on market integration and institutions is useful for analyzing the 
goods-market links between urban and rural areas.  In a simplistic, yet nevertheless 
useful, way for highlighting issues surrounding market integration and trade, we assume 
that within the national context there are two areas: one is called “rural” and the other is 
called “urban.”  They are characterized by different factor endowments.  Hence trade is 
beneficial between them since this can lead to gains linked to trade and specialization.  
However, the two areas are divided due to some exogenous factors.
3 
Though goods and factors can move from one area to the other, such movements 
involve costs.  Such costs may be information costs, transport costs, or policy-induced 
costs.
4  Such costs may be the result of noneconomic or historical factors, or both.  We 
will label all such costs under the general rubric of transfer costs
5 since all such costs 
involve the transfer of goods from one place to the other. 
The spatial competitive model (SPE), a conceptual model used to analyze trade, 
helps to understand the role of these transfer costs in connecting rural and urban spaces.  
In the SPE, the quantities of goods supplied and demanded, the direction of trade flows, 
and prices are determined in a way that maximizes the net gains to producers and 
consumers (i.e., producer and consumer surplus net of transfer costs across all markets 
[Enke 1951; Samuelson 1964; Takayama and Judge 1964]).  
The equilibrium conditions for the maximization problem that determines 
equilibrium prices and quantities lead to what is known as the spatial equilibrium 
                                                 
3 Note, then, that what we call these two areas is not important, nor does it matter what kinds of activities 
go on in these areas.  The point is that the areas form different markets, in some way, and that they have 
different factor endowments.  It does not affect the analysis even if “rural” activities occur in the urban 
area, or vice versa.  
4 Policy-induced costs are costs such as tariffs and restrictions on interregional movements of goods and 
factors.  We separate policy induced costs from transport and information costs since any change in the 
latter usually involves reallocation/re-direction of public and private resources while policy induced costs 
do not necessarily require such actions.  
5 Here, transfer costs are defined as all costs (observable and unobservable) incurred in moving a given 
product from one market place to another market place.  This definition is broader than the usual definition 
of transfer costs that equates it with transport costs alone.   4
arbitrage condition.  The spatial equilibrium arbitrage condition states that the price 
difference for goods between regions that trade must be equal to transfer costs (Tomek 
and Robinson 1990).  That is, the price in the higher-priced region must equal the price in 
the lower-priced region plus the transfer costs.  In the short run, price differentials 
between the two regions could be greater than transfer costs, allowing a trader to make 
“extra” profit.  However, in the long-run, traders will compete.  This competition will 
reduce the price differential to just cover the costs of moving (“trading”) goods from one 
region to the other.  With such competitive arbitrage, there will be neither pure economic 
profit nor loss.  On the other hand, if total transfer costs are larger than the price 
difference between the two regions, there will be no trade or links between them.  That is 
because the costs of moving (“trading”) goods exceed the price difference.  
Consequently, if a price difference persists over time, and is larger than the transfer costs 
between regions, there must be some market inefficiency.  This model shows the 
importance of transfer costs in linking two spatially separated locations that, in this case, 
are rural and urban areas.  Much of this paper will look at what factors affect the nature 
and magnitude of transfer costs, because if transfer costs can be reduced, trade can 
increase and the costs of goods will decline. 
More formally, we can formulate this spatial equilibrium arbitrage condition as 
the complementary slackness condition between profits to spatial arbitrage and quantity 
of trade.  Define the profits to arbitrage, R, as  
(, , ,, ,, ) 0 ijt it jit it jt jit ijt ijt it jt jt RP T C P P c i P τ ϕϕ =− −≤ , 
Where Pit is the price at location i in time t, and TCjit are the transfer costs of spatial 
arbitrage from location j to location i in time t.  Transfer costs may be a function of prices 
when ad valorem or variable rate tariffs exists; costs of transport between the two 
locations in time t, cjit; information costs between the two locations, iijt; transaction costs 
for exchange between two locations (i.e., costs associated with finding partners, reaching 
and enforcing agreements, and monitoring information in the market place), τjit; and other   5
transfer costs such as interlocation taxes and social barriers specific to the locations, ϕit 
and ϕjt.   
In SPE, two markets, i and j, are in long-run competitive equilibrium when the 
marginal profit of arbitrage equals zero, given that trade occurs that exhaust the rents to 
spatial arbitrage, i.e., Sij > 0, and (( , , , , , , ) ) 0 it jit it jt jit ijt ijt it jt jt jit PT CP P ci P S τϕ ϕ − −= , 
where Sjit is the quantity of homogeneous good shipped from market j to market i at time 
period t. 
The first-generation empirical literature on market integration focused primarily 
on price information and pair-wise correlations.  The basic notion tested is the case that if 
two spatially separated markets are integrated, then one should observe a high degree of 
interdependence in price determination and a high degree of price correlation between 
them (Horowitz 1981; Stigler and Sherwin 1985).  Later studies have added nuance to 
this notion.  
Spiller and Huang (1986), for instance, showed that this can happen only if there 
is no arbitrage cost.
6  They consider a two-region model where arbitrage costs reflect the 
maximum price differential that can develop between the two regions’ prices.  If the price 
differential between the two regions is less than the arbitrage cost, prices may diverge yet 
the two markets may be integrated.  The empirical findings reported in their paper show 
that, in the case of U.S. cities, nearby cities are more integrated than further-away cities. 
Spatial price differentials may also prevail in the short-run but adjust in the long-
run. Ravallion (1986) proposed a dynamic model of market integration that permits a 
distinction between short-run market integration and integration as a long-run tendency.  
He applied this to rice price data to examine market integration between Dhaka and the 
main surplus districts of Bangladesh.  The set up could be viewed as a market integration 
test for a central urban market (Dhaka), which is a deficit area, with interlinked rural 
markets (district towns), which are surplus areas.  His results indicate that the short-run 
                                                 
6 Arbitrage costs are the costs of purchasing goods in one market for immediate resale in another.     6
integration is very weak and that only two of the five districts show a tendency to long-
run integration.  
Imperfect competition can also lead to less integration than expected.  Faminow 
and Benson (1990) assumed that buyers and sellers are spatially dispersed and 
intraregional transport costs exist.  In this case, producers and consumers consider only 
the nearest rivals.  Hence, the market is characterized by oligopolistic (oligopsonistic) 
competition where the expected pricing response of rivals determines prices.  Faminow 
and Benson applied this framework to test hog market integration in Canada for the 
period between 1965 and 1975.  They found noncompetitive pricing for a subgroup of 
Canadian hog markets between 1965 and 1970.  Later institutional changes led to more 
integration.  In summary, the law of one price between two markets seems not to hold if 
there are transfer costs.  In such a situation, the seemingly positive return from arbitrage 
may only reflect the existence of transfer costs.  
This paper, on the other hand, recognizes that SPE is based on strong assumptions 
of the homogeneity of goods.  This is a special case of perfect integration, i.e., when the 
two markets are both integrated and in competitive equilibrium.  Actual market 
relationships are more complex, and the definition of market integration developed by 
Barrett and Li (2002) better reflects this complexity.  According to Barret and Li, market 
integration is most usefully defined as tradability or contestability between markets.  This 
definition will include the market clearance of flow of commodities behind SPE, as well 
as the transmission of price shocks from one market to another, or both.  There are 
different states of market integration one can show based on economic rents and transfer 
costs.  These are shown in Appendix Table 6.  
Normally what we observe in reality between rural and urban areas is either a 
complete lack of integration, i.e., segmented equilibrium or segmented disequilibrium, or 
imperfect integration.  The common case is one in which transfer costs are so large that 
trade will be nonexistent or discontinued so that the equilibrium conditions bind with 
equality in some periods and do not in others.    7
The argument we follow in this paper is that as we reduce transfer costs we will 
increase integration and therefore increase trade between rural and urban areas and, 
subsequently, the level of urban-rural linkages.  The literature has focused substantially 
on one kind of transfer cost, namely, transportation costs, and has not given sufficient 
attention to other types of transfer costs.  In this paper we will concentrate on other types 
of transfer costs as well, and especially on institutional costs that give rise to missing 
markets or imperfect markets.  In the following two sections we will explain these in 
detail and present case studies where new types of institutional arrangements have helped 
to significantly reduce these costs while increasing the potential benefit of urban and 
rural linkages. 
3.  Transfer Costs and Rural-Urban Linkages 
There are several interrelated factors that affect transfer costs and consequently 
the degree of rural-urban linkages in goods markets.  As shown in the previous section, 
transfer costs may arise due to information asymmetry
7 or high costs of transportation; 
transaction costs; policy-induced costs, such as ad valorem or interregional taxes or 
tariffs; and noneconomic factors, such as ethnic and racial tensions, language and cultural 
barriers, and a colonial past.  In the following subsections of this paper, we discuss how 
each of these factors affects urban-rural goods market linkages. 
Information Asymmetry 
The pervasive nature of information in every context of human interactions and 
decision making, growth, and economic development is very well known (Akelof 1970; 
Stiglitz 1988).  It is argued that information affects not only decision making inside firms 
and households but also the political process and collective decision making.  The 
availability of accurate, timely and appropriate information can enable producers to make 
                                                 
7 Lack of information about prices and uncertainty about quality can prevent the development of markets 
for goods or factors that would otherwise enhance welfare (Akerlof 1970).   8
better decisions regarding what and how much to produce and where to sell.  It helps 
traders make better decisions regarding where to buy and when and where to sell goods 
and at what prices.  Information also assists policy makers and researchers in formulating 
and implementing effective development policies and in informing food security 
situations in their country.  NGOs and donor agencies need information for effective 
coordination and execution of their development and humanitarian activities in 
developing countries.  
In the context of rural-urban linkages, the type of information required to make 
the above decisions could be prices and quantities of goods supplied and demanded in the 
rural and urban markets.  In addition, business investment decisions, whether in rural or 
urban areas, require information about local economic conditions such as labor market 
conditions, government polices, regulations and taxes, import and export market 
conditions, potential and current competition in the market, and the advantages and 
pitfalls of local business operation.  Further, in the context of rural-urban linkages in 
goods markets, some of the uncertainty could be the degree or rate of perishability of the 
raw material in its harvested state, specificity of the quality standards for the raw material 
or commodity, and seasonal variability of raw material supply. 
Traditionally, much of economic analysis assumed that markets are characterized 
by full information.  However, in practice, many markets are characterized by 
asymmetric information whereby either the buyer or the seller has considerably more 
information about the good than does the person or firm on the other side of the 
transaction.  Information imperfection has several serious economic and social 
consequences.  For example, information gaps can lead to a situation where productive 
private and/or social investments may be ignored due to incomplete understanding of 
relative returns.  It is also argued that even a small amount of information imperfection 
can have a profound effect on the nature of the equilibrium (Stiglitz 2002).  Information 
bottlenecks hinder effective rural-urban linkages by raising transaction costs by 
increasing search, screening, and bargaining costs.  The presence of information   9
imperfection gives rise to market power in the goods markets.  As the saying goes, 
“Information is power.” 
Despite its well-acknowledged importance, the availability of market information 
is very limited in developing countries.  There are several problems that are associated 
with the provision of market information.  First, the acquisition and processing of market 
information can be a very costly activity beyond the reach of small farmers and producers 
in developing countries.  As a result, it is argued that market information can be regarded 
as a public good in a situation where small farmers and producers cannot afford to pay for 
information (Shepherd 1997).  Second, the possession of different levels and qualities of 
exchange-relevant information creates opportunities for some economic agents to behave 
in a strategic manner, increasing the transaction costs of exchange.  In this paper, where 
we are concerned with goods markets between rural and urban areas, we can assume rural 
producers have better information than urban consumers for goods produced in rural 
areas, and urban producers have better information than rural consumers for goods 
produced in urban areas. 
There are several reasons for the existence of asymmetric market information.  
First, the reliability of information may vary over time; information that was once correct 
may become dated and therefore inaccurate.  Second, collecting information may involve 
costs; it does not pay for consumers to collect information beyond a point where the 
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of collecting it.  Third, consumers can 
remember and readily recall only a limited amount of information.  Fourth, there is a 
“reasonable” limit to the amount of information processed, a “bounded” rationality: 
consumers process information up to the point where the marginal benefit of obtaining 
information equals the marginal cost of processing it.  Fifth, consumers do not have 
sufficient knowledge to process the available information on all goods correctly. 
The lack or differential access to market information can create direct barriers to 
mutually beneficial exchange and greatly increase the costs associated with trade.  The 
consequences of asymmetric information are that equilibrium may not exist, or if 
equilibrium exists, resources are used less efficiently than they would be if there were   10
perfect, symmetric information.  Thus, the availability of efficient and reliable market 
information is a key ingredient in fostering rural-urban linkages. 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are costs associated with reaching and enforcing agreements 
(Williamson 1979, 1985).  An extended description of the various components of 
transaction costs is given in Jaffee (1995).  The various components of transaction costs 
include costs of searching for exchange opportunities and partners, screening information 
about the goods and prices, bargaining over the terms of trade, transferring the goods, 
services, titles, cash, etc., monitoring the exchange to assess whether the agreed terms are 
complied with, and enforcing the contract. 
Williamson (1985) cites two factors that give rise to transaction costs:  human 
factors and the quality of transaction.  The human factors are concerned with the bounded 
rationality and “opportunistic” behavior of the individuals undertaking the transaction.  
Bounded rationality means that it will be costly for individuals to contemplate and 
contract for every contingency that might arise over the course of the transaction.  An 
individual who acts “opportunistically” is one who takes advantage of opportunities or 
circumstances, often with little regard for principles or consequences.  
In terms of the quality of transaction, there are three important characteristics that 
affect transaction costs (Williamson 1985):  asset specificity, uncertainty, and market 
structure.  Asset specificity is defined as a situation where the extent to which physical 
and other assets required for the production and exchange of a particular good or trading 
relationship is durable and specialized.  Once specific assets are locked into a 
relationship, they can be redeployed only at a great loss in good value. 
The divergence between the acquisition and resale or salvage value of an asset 
gives rise to rents that are potentially appropriable through market transactions if 
insufficient competition in the market permits one of the parties to the transaction to act 
opportunistically.  Hence, the combination of few buyers in the good market combined   11
with asset specificity can lead to situations where producers in rural areas are at 
considerable risk in dealing with their trading partners in the urban areas, and vice versa.  
The consequences of asset specificity is that if the investor cannot be assured of realizing 
the full value of the transaction-specific investment, efficient investment that reduces the 
cost of exchange or production may not be made, resulting in higher costs for both 
parties, and the weakening of the linkage. 
Uncertainty is related to the overall degree of unknowns surrounding the 
exchange, and may involve the availability and quality of goods, the assurance of market 
outlets, and the operating “rules of the game.”  The greater the uncertainty surrounding a 
transaction the less likely the transaction is to be efficiently mediated by the spot market, 
which requires an immediate transaction.  As uncertainty increases, so does the cost of 
renegotiating contracts; as unforeseen contingencies arise, so does the potential for 
opportunistic behavior.  An increase in uncertainty, therefore, creates incentives to shift 
away from institutions like the spot market towards contingency contracts and vertical 
integration as a way of dealing with uncertainty.  The market fails to evolve when the 
uncertainty that surrounds the transaction causes costs to outweigh the benefits of 
exchange (Davidson and Weersink 2000). 
The key insight here from transactional costs economics is that rural-urban 
linkages may be very weak or cease to exist when the transaction costs are so high 
relative to the benefits of the transaction that the exchange does not occur between rural 
and urban areas.  Thus, central research challenges include (1) determining the primary 
transaction costs and (2) deciphering what type of policies, institutions, and business 
organization can minimize these costs in order to enhance rural-urban linkages.  
Transport and Communication Costs 
The development of transport infrastructure and the network and the availability 
of means of transport are important to integrate rural areas into the rest of the economy.  
In particular, in situations were there is a wide dispersion of production and consumption   12
centers, transport costs account for a significant proportion of total transfer costs.  An 
improvement in rural road quantity (length or density) and quality lowers travel time and 
reduces vehicle running and maintenance costs, which in turn lower the actual costs of 
marketing produce and reduce the costs of delivering inputs.  Some have argued that 
improved rural road networks that reduce these costs could actually abate motives to 
meet food needs through domestic production and, rather, promote specialization that 
raises farm income (Omamo 1998a, 1998b).  In contrast, the absence or poor quality of 
roads raises marketing costs, reduces producer incentives, and restrains rural-urban 
linkages.  
Similarly, the role of communications infrastructure in promoting economic 
development has been very well established.  The telephone is one of the most important 
means of communications used by traders in developing countries to obtain information 
needed for trade.  Of course, in rural areas, in particular, many also still rely on informal 
means of obtaining information such as visiting markets or talking with nearby neighbors 
and friends.  The availability and quality of the telephone system affects marketing costs 
by influencing producers’ and traders’ timely access to market information, and by 
enhancing the ability to find and negotiate transactions with trading partners.  
Other means of communication, such as fax, courier services, and email, can also 
each play a significant role in price discovery and trade.  Radio, television, and internet 
services can also help to disseminate price and other information.  Limited telephone 
service restricts access to information, impeding long-distance trade and raising 
transaction costs of traders by necessitating alternative, more expensive methods of 
communications such as frequent direct visits to the buyers or sellers.  Bottlenecks in 
communication, by restricting the access to information, limit the ability of traders to 
respond to new market opportunities and therefore limit the extent of urban-rural 
linkages.   13
Policy-Induced Barriers 
Government policies and regulations affect the linkages between urban and rural 
areas in several ways.  For example, during the period before market reform, the 
governments of most developing countries fixed grain prices; determined quantities of 
grain marketed; restricted regional grain movements; and restricted private sector 
participation in agricultural marketing through the issuing of licenses.  As a result, private 
traders were not able to exploit the potential spatial arbitrage opportunities by moving 
grain from surplus regions to deficit regions or from rural areas to urban areas.  Such 
government interventions created artificial surpluses and deficits in the grain marketing 
system and ultimately reduced the linkages between rural and urban markets.  More 
recently, governments in many developing countries have embarked on governance 
reforms like fiscal decentralization.  Although decentralization has many institutional 
advantages, it can have potential disadvantages as well.  For instance, policy changes 
may give local and regional governments the authority to make autonomous decisions 
and to impose tariffs on interregional trades, potentially increasing costs and time spent 
on transfers, and raising additional barriers to trade. 
Noneconomic Factors 
Many noneconomic factors can increase transfer costs and therefore reduce the 
probability of urban-rural linkages.  A very important factor, although subtle in many 
cases, is social exclusion.  Many groups in society are subject to economic, political, or 
cultural exclusion through different mechanisms and institutions; this phenomenon 
substantially decreases their access to various markets and further adds to transfer costs. 
Social exclusion from different markets—labor, credit, access to education—is a 
crucial issue in multiracial and multilingual countries, and it can diminish rural–urban 
linkages.  Discrimination and exclusion related to ethnicity, culture, physical appearance 
and religion take place in ways both obvious and subtle.  For instance, indigenous or 
ethnic minorities are more likely to be poor than other groups, and historically, they, as   14
well as associations of rural farmers, have been excluded from decision processes of local 
government organizations.  These marginalized groups are characterized by their 
organizational weaknesses such as lack of capacity and poverty.  From an economic 
perspective their exclusion from certain markets affects their economic outcomes and can 
restrict their potential to migrate or to access goods and services in nearby markets.  The 
exclusion from public and private assets such as education, and physical, financial, or 
organizational capital can restrict their current and future economic opportunities and 
confine them to a rural poverty trap.  Exclusion may also affect the rate of return on the 
assets they do posses:  for instance, when occupational segregation exists—i.e., certain 
groups do not have access to better paid-jobs—then there may be differences in the 
economic returns to education for similarly educated people. 
4.  Policies and Institutions for Enhancing Rural-Urban Linkages 
The previous two sections presented a conceptual framework for understanding 
transfers of goods between rural and urban areas, and identified and described five factors 
that affect transfer costs and, ultimately, the degree of rural-urban linkages.  In this 
section we look into specific case studies and examples of these factors to show how the 
evolution and design of institutions can decrease imperfections and reduce transfer costs.  
Institutions play a critical part in strengthening markets for the commodities that 
are produced, bought, and sold in rural as well as in urban areas and therefore in linking 
rural areas to urban areas and vice versa.  Effective institutions can reduce information 
asymmetries, minimize transaction costs, reduce transport and communication costs, 
coordinate policies, and address noneconomic barriers.  When a market does not exist or 
does not work efficiently, market information is costly; markets themselves are not 
accessible; producers capture little of the value that they create; demand and supply are 
highly unstable; and distribution costs are very high.  All of these costs reduce the 
possibilities of market integration.   15
Table 1 puts forth some of the roles and types of market institutions that can be 
reduce transfer costs, corresponding to the five barriers previously identified.  In this 
section, lessons from the various roles of market institutions are analyzed through 
specific case studies.  Specifically, we look at (1) how the creation of new food value-
chains and types of market intermediation by supermarkets in Indonesia can address 
problems of asymmetric information; (2) how cooperatives in Ethiopia and Kenya can 
reduce transactions costs; (3) how investments in rural telecommunications in 
Bangladesh and Peru can reduce communications costs; (4) how policy reforms of 
previously controlled grain markets can substantially increase transfer costs; and (5) how 
ethnic discrimination in Peru can create noneconomic barriers that inhibit access to 
human capital and financial markets.  
Table 1—Role and type of institutions for urban-rural linkages, and case studies 
Role of institutions  Type of institutions/intervention 
1. Reduce information asymmetry  •  Group-based contract 
•  Peer monitoring mechanisms 
•  Modern intermediaries/new value-chains 
•  Public codes on standards and safety 
 
2. Reduce transaction costs  •  Vertical coordination 
•  Vertical integration  
•  Farmers’ groups and cooperatives 
•  Producers marketing associations 
•  Firm-farm partnerships 
 
3. Reduce transport and 
communication costs 
•  Community-based management 
•  Public private partnerships 
•  Business-NGO partnerships 
 
4. Reduce policy induced barriers  •  Coordination among jurisdictions 
•  Local, regional, and central policy alignments 
•  Reducing policy biases 
 
5. Reduce noneconomic barriers  •  Minority rights, legal institutions, organizations for minorities 
•  Affirmative actions 
 
These case studies offer examples of the main sources of transfer costs, but some 
cases involve multiple sources of transfer costs, thus illustrating how these factors are not 
mutually exclusive but rather frequently occur simultaneously.    16
Reducing Information Costs: Intermediation, Supermarkets, and the New 
Value-Chain in Indonesia 
This section focuses on how information asymmetry between urban and rural 
areas hinders urban-rural linkages.  If information is asymmetrically distributed between 
buyers and sellers, then there may be rationing in the credit market, and certain goods 
markets may be severely limited or even break down (a form of the “lemon” problem 
shown by Akerlof 1970).  The asymmetric information can make negotiations protracted, 
costly and unsuccessful (Farrel 1987), and there is almost always a public intervention 
that can improve welfare (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986).  The asymmetry of information 
has been used as a cause in rationalizing the existence of many agrarian institutions and 
production relations in developing countries.
8  There is also literature that argues that 
information asymmetry between groups is high compared to information asymmetry 
within a group and new institutions are devised based on this assumption.
9 
Transactions can take place directly between producers based in rural areas and 
consumers based in urban areas and vice versa, when each group has perfect information 
about the other.  Such information could be economic, involving demand for a particular 
good or knowledge about default risk or payment regularity; or could be about own 
behaviors such as preferences, tastes, or trustworthiness, among others.  However, due to 
the information asymmetry between producers and consumers based in two spatially 
separated locations, intermediaries emerge who facilitate the transaction between urban 
and rural areas.  Better known as middlemen in the context of developing countries, they 
mediate selling between the producer of a good and its potential consumers.  Economic 
literature rationalizes the intermediation by arguing that intermediaries emerge because 
they are reducing information asymmetries.
10 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Stiglitz (1986) and Bardhan (1989) for an overview of the literature on agrarian 
institutions. 
9 See, for instance, the literature on group-based lending and peer-monitoring to overcome information 
asymmetry such as Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993), and Stiglitz (1990).  
10 See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for information asymmetries in the context of financial intermediaries and 
Chowdhury (2004) in the context of product market intermediaries.    17
Since intermediaries exist due to information asymmetry, any change in 
information asymmetry can lead to a change in the intermediation process and can lead to 
the demise of existing (traditional) intermediaries and the rise of new (modern) 
intermediaries.  The case of the food value-chain in fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) in 
Indonesia shows how asymmetric information can lead to the emergence of a long chain 
of intermediaries and that a change in information can bring about a change in the 
intermediation process.  For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the existing 
intermediation process as the “traditional food value-chain,” and the emerging 
intermediation process as the “modern food value-chain.”
11  
Figure 1 shows the traditional value-chain that has persisted in Indonesia in FFV 
for decades.  In a typical setting of a traditional value-chain, a producer based in a rural 
area produces fruits or vegetables for self-consumption and for the urban market with 
little or no information about product quality, grades and standards, or food safety 
demanded by urban consumers.  The producer sells part of the goods remaining after self-
consumption to a vendor.  After transactions in multiple spot markets—rural market, 
wholesale market, wet market, retail market—involving multiple intermediaries—
vendors, wholesalers, wet marketers, traditional retailers—goods reach the final 
consumers in urban areas.  




Figure 2 depicts the modern value-chain now emerging in the Indonesian food 
sector. In contrast to the traditional value-chain, the modern value-chain reduces several 
of the spot markets and begins at the retailer’s end.  As a result the farmer and vendor 
have more information on consumers’ preferences in urban areas.  Such modern retailers, 
frequently supermarkets, establish contractual relationships with vendors, and the 
                                                 
11 This case is based on Chowdhury, Gulati, and Gumbira-Sa’id (2004). 
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vendors establish similar contractual relationships with farmers.  In comparison to 
traditional vendors, vendors working within the modern value-chain possess superior 
information on consumers’ preferences, on the quality of goods, and technology.  They 
receive guidelines on grades, standards, and goods quality.  As part of the supply 
agreement, vendors implement guidelines on farming.  For each fruit and vegetable, the 
supermarket specifies a grade and standard requirement, to which each fruit or vegetable 
must conform.  To ensure that the goods produced in rural areas meet the quality desired 
in urban areas, supermarkets usually monitor both on-farm and off-farm activities by 
controlling fertilizer applications, quality of seeds, harvesting, and postharvesting 
handling techniques.  




Modern vendors play a very important role in the modern value-chain by 
minimizing the information gap between urban consumers and rural producers and 
improving information on urban consumers’ preferences.  They also supply necessary 
seeds, technology and other inputs, and train farmers on how to achieve the required 
standards.  
A real-world example can help to visualize this new intermediation process.  
Consider a consumer based in Jakarta who wants to consume fresh green pepper of a 
particular size and taste.  With traditional intermediation, farmers who produce do not 
know what color, size, and taste is demanded in Jakarta.  Without knowing any of the 
attributes demanded by consumers, peppers are produced by farmers, sold in spot 
markets, purchased by middlemen and other traders, and sold to wet markets, where they 
are purchased by retailers, who in turn sell them to consumers in Jakarta.  Since the 
whole value-chain involves many nonintegrated agents without any type of coordination, 
there are two major problems:  first, products, in this case, green pepper, may not be 
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produced according to the preferences of end consumers since rural farmers based in 
villages may lack information about the preference of urban consumers based in cities.  
Second, there may be high transactions costs due to the search as well as monitoring and 
enforcement involved at each stage of the spot market.  In a market characterized by 
imperfect competition, a high transaction cost is not unlikely.  
The emergence of the new intermediation process can be considered a response to 
meet urban demand for FFV and reduce transactions costs.  Reduction of intermediaries 
to a few vertically integrated agents is a way to meet the changed demand in urban areas.  
Since integration can also reduce the need for farmers and supermarkets to search for 
market transactions, it is also a way to reduce transaction costs.
12  
Reducing Transactions Costs:  Dairy Cooperatives in Ethiopia and Kenya 
Cooperatives can potentially enhance rural-urban linkages by reducing the level 
of transaction costs affecting market participation of small-holders. In terms of 
employment, human welfare, and political stability, smallholder agriculture is a very 
important economic sector in Sub-Saharan Africa (Delgado 1999).  Despite its 
importance, historically this sector has not been linked to urban areas and to the market 
economy due to the lack of appropriate polices and institutions.  Recently, many 
developing countries have embarked on a series of policy changes in order to increase 
smallholder and private-sector participation in the market economy.  However, 
smallholders may still not be able to take advantage of market opportunities created by 
recent macroeconomic reforms, structural adjustments, and market liberalization policies 
(Jayne 1998; Kherallah et al. 2002).  The emerging lesson from recent market reforms 
and policy changes is that, in addition to market reform and policy changes, there is a 
need for institutional development that can increase the access and responsiveness of 
smallholders to market opportunities (Delgado 1999; Kherallah et al. 2002; Jayne 1998). 
                                                 
12 Note that there is a general concern that the new intermediation process described here favors large 
producers over small ones. However, in this discussion we have not distinguished between large and small 
producers.   20
The constraints facing smallholder agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa arise from 
high transaction costs, among others.  The risk of unstable marketing margins, market 
thinness, uncertainty concerning government policies, theft and storage spoilage, and 
unenforceability of contracts, along with high transportation and storage costs, result in 
large and unstable transaction costs.  The magnitude of transactions costs is found to be 
negatively related to smallholders’ decision to participate in the market (Goetz 1992; de 
Janvry 1991; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000).  In this regard, the principal tools for 
reducing transactions costs are institutional innovations such as contract farming, out-
grower schemes, cooperatives, and vertical integration.  The case studies of dairy 
cooperatives in Ethiopia (Holloway et al. 2000) and Kenya (Staal, Delgado, and Charles 
1997) illustrate how cooperatives can enhance rural-urban linkages.  
Part of the reason for high transaction costs is the nature of milk as a commodity 
(Staal, Delgado, and Charles 1997; Holloway et al. 2000).  First, raw milk is highly 
perishable, which requires not only timely transportation to either consumption or 
processing centers but also a reliable market outlet.  Second, milk production is a year-
round activity and, as a result, dairy producers are concerned with securing stable market 
outlets for their year-round milk production.  Third, raw milk is a “bulky” commodity, 
which implies relatively high transportation costs per unit.  Fourth, the composition and 
quality of milk are highly variable and not easily verifiable.  This implies higher costs of 
monitoring milk quality and potential losses by producers, traders, processors, and 
consumers when milk is spoiled or adulterated.  The lack of easily measurable quality 
standards may allow agents who purchase raw milk from producers to behave 
opportunistically, such as by rejecting milk without genuine justification.  By the same 
token, dairy producers may try to opportunistically sell adulterated or poor quality milk to 
buyers. 
Thus, small-scale dairy production and marketing involve high transaction costs 
that make spot market coordination less efficient or nonexistent.  Under such 
circumstances, dairy cooperatives can play a critical role in enabling the participation of 
smallholder producers in the formal urban milk market by reducing the transactions costs.   21
There are several ways cooperatives can reduce transaction costs and support 
commodity market development and coordination (Jaffee 1995; Staatz 1987).  First, 
cooperatives counter the problem of needed “lumpy” investments in marketing 
infrastructure and services since the fixed costs of such investments can be shared among 
group members.  In this way cooperatives can overcome smallholders’ barriers of access 
to assets, information, and services.  Second, cooperatives allow for the provision of 
certain public goods like product promotion that may be neither possible nor profitable 
on an individual basis.  Third, cooperatives reduce or pool member risks by guaranteeing 
commodity purchases and sales on behalf of members and provide insurance, credit, or 
both to members.  Fourth, cooperatives lower transaction costs for both members and for 
nonmembers trading with members by settling disputes and obtaining, interpreting and 
disseminating information about production, markets, and farmer and trader competence 
and creditworthiness.  Fifth, cooperatives provide for the exercise of market power by 
their members through collective negotiations with suppliers or buyers, by controlling or 
withholding member supply into the market, and by informing members about prevailing 
terms of trade. 
In Ethiopia, the majority of milk produced by smallholders outside urban centers 
is processed into products by the farm household and then sold to traders or other 
households in local markets (Holloway et al. 2000).  Sales of fresh milk by smallholder 
farmers are significant only when they are close to formal milk marketing facilities such 
as those run by the government.  Recently, however, “milk groups,” which are milk 
marketing cooperatives, were established by the Ethiopian government with the support 
of the Finnish International Development Association.  The milk groups buy milk from 
both members and nonmembers, process it, and sell the processed goods to traders and 
local consumers.  Thus, the milk marketing cooperatives provide an alternative market 
outlet for the sale of fluid milk by the producers and link the smallholder dairy producers 
to the formal urban milk market.  Prior to the formation of the milk groups nearly all 
locally produced milk was processed into butter and a local form of cottage cheese by the 
households.  The cooperatives have thus expanded the market for the dairy producers.    22
The introduction of these milk groups also has the potential to significantly reduce 
transaction costs by minimizing the time required to market milk.  
In Kenya, the dairy cooperatives enable the participation of smallholder producers 
in the formal urban milk market by reducing their transaction costs through pooling risk, 
lowering unit collection costs, making inputs available, and enhancing bargaining power.  
Cooperatives improve the stability of the market outlet for both milk processors and 
smallholders.  Dairy cooperatives may lower search costs for processors and make milk 
supplies more reliable while also providing a guaranteed market outlet that provides 
stable prices for smallholder producers.  The resulting lower search costs and lower risk 
to smallholders who invested in specialized dairy production has probably contributed to 
the success of smallholder dairying in Kenya.  Significant price increases were also 
observed for producers using the dairy cooperatives’ marketing channel for milk because 
the dairy cooperatives allowed the members to explore alternative market outlets.  
Nonetheless, the success of cooperatives in the cases described above should be 
noted with caution.  These success stories are both product and country specific and may 
not be applicable to other circumstances.  As one caveat, the historical experience of 
many producer cooperatives suggests a tendency to deviate from the initial objective of 
maximizing members’ profit, and, rather, to be captured by managers.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to design the governance structure in a fashion that renders the cooperative 
continually effective for its members. 
Reducing Communication Costs: 
Rural Telecommunications in Bangladesh and Peru 
The availability of telecommunication services in rural areas in developing 
countries can break the isolation for communities and households living there by 
connecting them to urban areas and to the rest of the country and world.  The main 
benefit of such a service could be a reduction in the cost of communications for the rural 
communities as well for urban communities.  This might result in changes in the 
production structure, labor allocation, and consumption composition, and increase overall   23
welfare.  For urban communities, this can increase the link with rural areas by reducing 
search costs, and providing faster and cheaper communications than before.  In addition, 
rural communities can use their access to telecommunications to access information and 
communication technologies (ICT).  This can further reduce the so called rural-urban 
divide and connect rural communities beyond their national geographic boundary to a 
wider global community.  
Two recent examples (Chowdhury 2005 in Bangladesh; Galdo and Torero 2005 in 
Peru) demonstrate the impact of rural telecommunication projects.  Until recently, rural 
households both in Bangladesh and Peru only had limited access to telephone services.  
However two recent projects, the village pay phone program (VPP) in Bangladesh and 
FITEL (after its Spanish acronym, Fondo de Inversion en Telecommunicaciones) in Peru 
were instrumental in increasing rural households’ access to publicly accessible phones.  
Table 2 shows the relationship between the distance to the nearest public 
telephone and its use.  As expected, in both cases, among other factors, rural households’ 
public telephone use depends on travel time: the longer the travel time to the nearest 
telephone, the lower the use.  Thus, holding tariff rates and other factors constant, the 
higher the nontariff cost to the nearest telephone, the lower the use.  This suggests that a  
Table 2—One-way travel time to the nearest public telephone and usage rate 
One-way travel time  Percentage of sample in category  Usage rate (%) 
Bangladesh    
 Within the village
a 15.85  64.44 
 Within 30 minutes distance  45.07  26.56 
 Within one hour distance  27.82  21.52 
 More than one hour distance  11.27  18.75 
  Total  100.00  30.28 
Peru    
 Within the village
a 21.60  90.27 
 Within 30 minutes distance  44.00  88.12 
 Within one hour distance  7.70  76.62 
 More than one hour distance  26.70  66.41 
  Total  100.00  83.00 
Source:  Chowdhury (2005), and Galdo and Torero (2005). 
a Zero or negligible distance.  
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reduction in travel time and travel costs to a public telephone may increase rural 
households’ use of telecommunications services and therefore improve links to 
intermediate and big cities. 
More than 30 percent of households surveyed in Bangladesh and 76 percent of 
households surveyed in Peru have at least one or more members who use the public 
telephone.  Table 2 suggests that the availability of a telephone at the village level has 
some impact on telephone use as households from villages with a telephone have a higher 
usage rate than households from villages without a telephone. This remains unchanged 
across income groups (not shown in the table).  
Households in rural areas use the telephone both as a production input and a 
consumption good.  They collect information that has immediate economic benefits and 
contributes to family well-being.  Table 3 indicates that households in rural areas in 
Bangladesh and Peru use the telephone for both economic and social purposes.  The 
destination of almost all telephone calls generated in the rural areas is to urban areas.  
Approximately one-third of the telephone calls were carried out for business purposes, 
including searching for market information, prices, and transactions.  The second most 
important reason for the use of the telephone is talking with family and friends.  The third 
most prevalent reason for calling is to gather information about employment 
opportunities, both domestic and abroad.  In Bangladesh, personal and family networks 
usually play an important role in job-matching, and the availability of a telephone at the 
Table 3—Main reason for telephone calling in Bangladesh and Peru 
Reasons for calling  Percent of households in Bangladesh  Percent of households in Peru 
 (percent) 
Business 31.3  43 
Health 8.3  4 
Employment 10.4  5 
Land 2.1 0 
Family 27.1  35 
Remittance 2.1  0 
Others 18.8  13 
Source:  Chowdhury (2005) and Galdo and Torero (2005). 
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village level can be a cost-saving method for job-seeking.  Other important reasons for 
calling include health and medical purposes. 
Similarly, Table 4 presents the benefits to households from the use of public 
telephones in rural areas of Peru.  Rural households are aware that telecommunication 
services provide a faster communication and save them from having to physically retrieve 
the necessary information.  It is important to note that over a quarter of the households 
believe that the availability of public telephones breaks the isolation that rural households 
otherwise face.  Moreover, they save both money and time due to the availability of 
public telephones. 
Table 4—Perceived benefits in Peru 
Benefits
a  Percent of households 
 (percent) 
Fast communication  55.0 
Avoid trips  32.9 
Avoid isolation  25.7 
Save money  19.5 
Save time  24.2 
Emergencies 34.2 
Source: Galdo and Torero (2005).  
a Households can manifest to have more than one benefit. 
 
However, these benefits have costs, including the direct costs of tariffs and the 
indirect costs of traveling time and costs.  To examine the welfare improvements of rural 
households due to rural telecommunication services, Chowdhury (2005) and Galdo and 
Torero (2005) have measured the Hicksian compensating variation associated with 
telephone use.  The compensating variation (CV) is how much money a household would 
be willing to give up to obtain a given item (in this case, technological change:  a 
telephone), and still consider itself at the same level of utility (i.e., neither worse nor 
better off than before giving up the money). 
Table 5 shows the estimated CVs over traditional alternatives to telephone use.  
The alternatives are: sending a letter (public postal services, couriers, and transport 
agencies), sending a physical person (travel), and radio communication.  In Bangladesh,   26
alternatives also include telephoning from the second-nearest place.  The estimated CVs 
show that, for all income groups (arranged in four expenditure quartiles) and for both 
countries, the rural telephone projects are welfare-improving.  This improvement in 
welfare could be attributed in part to the better access to information by rural households 
and consequent better access to markets in intermediate and major towns. 
Table 5—Estimated compensating variation:  Alternative to the service of rural telephony
a 
  Quartile of expenditure 
  Bottom 25 percent      Top 25 percent 
Alternatives I  II  III  IV 
  Compensating Variation (CV) per call (US$) 
Bangladesh  
  Telephone from other place  0.15  0.21 0.20  0.20 
  Sending letter (post office)  0.11  0.14  0.13  0.13 
  Travel  0.65  0.84  0.78  0.81 
  Others  1.19  1.59  1.44  1.56 
Peru        
  Sending letter (mail office)  2.01  1.93  1.81  1.72 
  Sending letter (transport agency)  1.62  1.57  1.51  1.47 
  Radio  1.67  1.58  1.52  1.45 
  Travel  2.91  2.74  2.52  2.07 
Source: Chowdhury (2005), and Galdo and Torero (2005). 
a Compensated variation following Small and Rosen (1981); exchange rate $US1 = tk 56 (2001); 
US$1 = S/3.38 (1999). 
Policy-Induced Barriers: 
Governance Reforms and the Rise of Interregional Taxation in Ethiopia 
The case of grain marketing in Ethiopia illustrates how policy-induced barriers 
can substantially increase transfer costs and restrict the possibilities of rural-urban and 
rural-rural integration.  In the past, the central government of Ethiopia fixed grain prices, 
determined quantities of grain marketed, restricted regional grain movements, and 
restricted private-sector participation in agricultural marketing by controlling operating 
licenses.  As a result, private traders were not able to exploit the potential spatial 
arbitrage opportunities by moving grain from surplus regions to deficit regions or from 
rural areas to urban areas.  However, in recent years, there has been a shift from the 
centrally controlled grain-marketing system to a decentralized and more liberalized one.   27
In 1992, as part of measures to strengthen fiscal decentralization policy, local and 
regional authorities were allowed to could impose taxes on grain trade as a way to raise 
revenue.  As a result, a number of local and regional governments established grain 
checkpoints (“kella”) at several locations in the country.
13  The number of checkpoints on 
a given grain trading route varied from one to 18 while the total time spent for checkpoint 
inspections varied from one to three hours.  The amount of tax charged at each 
checkpoint also varied from 1.50 to 15.00 birr/100 kg.,
14 which accounted for 5 to 10 
percent of the price received by producers.  In addition, the checkpoint tax collection also 
created a lot of risk and uncertainty in the grain trade because of lack of complete 
information on the exact amount of checkpoint charges and lack of clarity in the 
directives, which allowed arbitrariness in charges by the controllers to suit their own 
individual situations. 
While the taxes on grain could serve the fiscal objectives of the regional 
governments, they also increased grain transfer costs and negatively affected rural-urban 
linkages.  In a survey of 220 traders in 26 markets across the country, about 35 percent of 
the traders ranked checkpoint control as the number one constraint to doing grain 
business (Dessalegn, Jayne, and Shaffer 1998). 
Similar restrictions exist on grain movement in India, and Indonesian authorities 
have imposed interprovincial taxes on trade.  These, too, increase transfer costs and 
reduce the possibility of market integration.  
Noneconomic Factors:  Ethnicity in Peru
15   
Finally, social barriers (e.g., ethnicity, race, culture, and language), and historical 
factors (e.g., colonial past) can also add to transfer costs.  Social exclusion can impede 
access to specific markets, the acquisition of specific assets, or the securing of specific 
                                                 
13 Several studies document the effects of such checkpoints on grain movements (Tirfe and Abraham 1995; 
Gabre-Madhin 2001; Diskin and Molla 1995; Negassa and Jayne 1997; Dessalegn, Jayne, and Shaffer 
1998). 
14 The exchange rate is approximately US$1 = 8 Ethiopian birr.  
15 This section is based on Torero et al. (2004).   28
jobs.  Social exclusion, particularly involving ethnicity and income class, is a prominent 
phenomenon in Peru where exclusion isolates marginalized groups, often restricting their 
potential to migrate and their access to services and goods in market towns.  
Torero et al. (2004) used a score-based procedure to capture the impact of 
ethnicity and “social groupings,” and consequently of social exclusion, on access to 
education, health, and phone services.  Explanatory variables in this analysis included 
mother tongue, religion, and parental background, in addition to the racial-ethnic score.  
Given the multi-ethnic heritage of many Peruvians, a trained interviewer assigned each 
survey respondent an independent score of 1 to 10 in each of four categories:  Asian, 
White, Indigenous, and Black—groups that people readily recognize as distinct racial 
groups.
16  Zero indicated no physical characteristics associated with a particular group 
(i.e., either Asian, White, Indigenous, or Black) and 10 indicating the individual had most 
features associated with that particular group.  Thus, for example, an individual with 
intensities of 2 (White), 8 (Indigenous), 0 (Black), and 1 (Asian), would be considered 
predominantly indigenous.  With these continuous racial-intensity indicators, it was 
possible to characterize a person as a mestizo, but there was still racial variance within 
the category. 
As shown in Figure 3, years of schooling, study at a private institution, access to 
phone lines, and access to health insurance were all positively related to score intensity in 
the White group and negatively related to score intensity in the Indigenous group.  
Similarly, migrant status and family size were positively correlated with Indigenous 
intensity and negatively correlated with White intensity. 
In the case of education, Diaz et al. (2004) modeled education attainment using a 
hazard model that controlled for gender, cohort, religion, mother tongue, and race.  The 
results showed a negative relationship between indigenous intensity and years of 
                                                 
16 Most of the Peruvian population tends to define itself as “mestizo,” which includes people with widely 
varying characteristics who also perceive themselves as being different from others and who others 
perceive as being different.  While several studies support the approach used in the study, criticism of this 
method led to intensive pre-fieldwork training designed to reduce the problems associated with the 
reliability of interviewers’ observations of race and ethnicity (Torero et al. 2004).  
























































































































































































































































































education, whereas a positive relationship between white intensity and education still 
held.  Individuals with White racial characteristics were more likely to stay longer in the 
educational system than their Indigenous peers.  
Mirroring the case of educational attainment generally, Diaz et al. (2004) also 
found a similar pattern regarding participation in private education.  Attendance at private 
schools was higher among “White” groups than among those with indigenous 
characteristics, with attendance highest among the youngest.  For the cohort born during 
the 1940s, 16 percent of the individuals in the highest White quintile attended a private 
institution, while no individuals in the lowest White quintile did so.  The spread increased 
for the cohort born in the late 1970s with the respective percentages 9 and 34 percent.  
Similar results were found when comparing the lowest and highest quintiles in the 
distribution of Indigenous intensity, although the difference between the extreme White 
quintiles was higher than the one between the extreme indigenous quintiles.
17  
With respect to access to credit, Torero et al. (2004) found “reasonable” 
discrimination in the sense that lenders may discriminate by applying stricter credit 
standards, charging higher interest rates, or requiring more collateral on loans from less 
creditworthy borrowers.
18  Nevertheless, no major direct effect of ethnicity on access to 
credit was identified once financial assets and other private assets of the household 
(household ownership, value of assets, possession of financial savings) were controlled 
for.  This does not suggest that discrimination does not exist in credit markets but rather 
that ethnic differences in access to credit are correlated with observable and likely 
indirect characteristics that explain differences in access.  
With respect to the labor market in Peru, Moreno et al. (2004) conducted a 
pseudo-audit study of three selected occupations.  They found systematic (and 
significant) differences in the expected wages of individuals conducting job searches 
according to their racial groups.  
                                                 
17 Similar results were found when controlling for other differences within each racial quintile by using 
matching techniques. 
18 This result is similar to similar to Elliehausen and Lawrence (1990).   31
Torero et al. (2004) found significant differences in earnings between 
predominantly white and predominantly indigenous workers after controlling for 
personal, labor market (occupation, sector and firm size), and ethnic characteristics.  
These differences were not observed among the self-employed.  However, a 
decomposition technique showed that a large part of the apparent earnings gap among 
racial and ethnic groups for the self-employed was explained by differences in individual 
characteristics, which suggests that exclusion mechanisms operate not only in the labor 
market but also when individuals are in the process of acquiring skills. 
5.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Markets link rural and urban areas by providing space, form and time utility for 
goods and factors, and ensure their efficient movement across space.  The efficiency and 
effectiveness of markets in linking rural and urban areas are very important to economic 
growth and development.  Changes at home and abroad, such as rapid urbanization, 
changes in dietary composition, emergence of large supermarkets and agro-processors, 
globalization, and the spread of information and communication technologies, call for 
urban-rural market integration. 
However, in many developing countries, markets across rural and urban space 
may be integrated only partially, and in extreme cases, not at all.  Transfer costs can 
become significant obstacles to market integration and include:  information 
asymmetries, transaction costs, transport and communication costs, policy-induced 
barriers, and social and noneconomic barriers.  Our review of the experiences of 
supermarkets, dairy cooperatives, and rural telephony demonstrates that institutional 
innovations can play a catalytic role in reducing transfer costs and, consequently, 
enhancing rural-urban linkages.  Accordingly, the presence of inappropriate policies, 
such as price controls in Ethiopia, or noneconomic factors, such as social exclusion in 
Peru, can inhibit links between urban and rural markets.    32
New institutions such as modern intermediaries linked to supermarkets and food 
processors can reduce information asymmetries between urban consumers and rural 
producers.  Producers’ cooperatives can pool the risks, increase bargaining power, and 
reduce transaction costs for small producers and reduce the supply variability for urban 
processors and consumers.  New types of partnerships such as business-NGO 
partnerships or public-private partnerships can help to provide access to infrastructure 
such as telecommunications thereby reducing communication costs for rural communities 
and improving their connection to urban areas.  
The issues surrounding transfer costs hindering market integration deserve 
priority attention by policymakers and development agencies in developing countries.  
Experience from Africa and other developing countries clearly show that mere market 
liberalization may not be sufficient to integrate rural and urban markets when information 
asymmetries, transaction costs, transport and communication costs, and other barriers 
inhibit efficient integration.  Policy reforms to reduce transfer costs and promote urban-
rural links will require not only further investment in infrastructure or removing controls 
on market prices but also a focus on the development of sound institutional arrangements.   33
Appendix Table 
Table 6—Barret and Li concepts of spatial equilibrium and market integration 
Consistent with SPE  Inconsistent with SPE 
(1) Perfect integration: 
0 and  0 jit jit RS =≥  
(3) Imperfect integration: 
0 and  0 jit jit RS ≠ >  
(2) Segmented equilibrium: 
0 and  0 jit jit RS <=  
(4) Segmented disequilibrium: 
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